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VICTORIES FOR PRIVACY AND LOSSES
FOR JOURNALISM?
FIVE PRIVACY CONTROVERSIES FROM
2004 AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE FUTURE OF REPORTAGE
Clay Calvert∗
INTRODUCTION
A primary role of the press in a democratic society, protected
broadly in the United States under the First Amendment,1 is to
fairly, truthfully, and comprehensively report to citizens on matters
of public concern.2 The ethics code of the Radio-Television News
∗ Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State
University. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The
author thanks David Johnson of the McGeorge School of Law for his editing
assistance and review of a draft of this manuscript.
1
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
2
The code of ethics of one major journalism organization provides:
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public
enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of
democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by
seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events
and issues. Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties
strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty.

649
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Directors Association, for instance, advances a policy that
admonishes broadcast journalists to “pursue truth aggressively and
present the news accurately, in context, and as completely as
possible.”3 In addition to this pivotal role as truthteller, the press
plays a vital function as a watchdog or unofficial Fourth Estate,
checking and exposing government abuses of power.4
There are, however, social and legal concerns at loggerheads
with policies that permit, privilege, and promote an aggressive
press. In particular, privacy, which Professor Anita Allen recently
described as “a dominant theme in public policy in the United
States,”5 often conflicts and competes with the jobs of journalists
by denying them access to information or images that the public is
interested in receiving.6 For instance, the common law tort of
intrusion into seclusion restricts journalists’ ability to gather
information while safeguarding individual privacy of both space
and action.7 California’s anti-paparazzi law also protects privacy
Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics, available at http://www.
spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
3
Radio-Television News Directors Association Code of Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, available at http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe. shtml
(last visited Jan. 5, 2005).
4
As Columbia University Professor Herbert Gans recently wrote, the
watchdog role represents “the journalists’ finest opportunity to show that they
are working to advance democracy.” HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE
NEWS 79 (2003). Whether the press actually plays this role today, however, is
up for debate. See Marty Kaplan, The Armstrong Effect, DAILY VARIETY, Jan.
19, 2005, at 60 (contending that “[b]y and large, neither politicians nor
entertainment executives regard the press as a check on the abuse of power, or
as the representatives of the public. They regard journalists as nuisances—useful
idiots”).
5
Anita L. Allen, 2003 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Privacy Isn’t Everything:
Accountability as a Personal and Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375, 1375
(2003).
6
See generally Sandra F. Chance, The First Amendment in the New
Millennium: How a Shifting Paradigm Threatens the First Amendment and Free
Speech, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 174-75 (2000) (describing a
number of legislative initiatives and policies designed to protect privacy that
negatively affect journalists’ ability to gather information).
7
See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d
60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (describing the elements of the tort of intrusion into
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against journalists who might engage in either physical or
constructive trespasses to obtain images of, as the statute puts it,
“personal or familial activities.”8 In brief, as the author of this
article and a colleague argued elsewhere in 2004, “the First
Amendment is not a license to destroy an individual’s privacy.”9
On the other hand, journalists often assert and claim privacy
interests of their own when gathering news, such as keeping
private and confidential the names of sources who have supplied
them with important information. As Eugene Volokh, a professor
of law at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA),
recently wrote, “[T]ips from confidential sources often help
journalists (print or electronic) uncover crime and misconduct. If
journalists had to reveal such sources, many of these sources
would stop talking.”10
This article examines five separate issues and controversies
that arose in 2004, each involving privacy, and analyzes their
potential impact on the practice and policies of journalism and the
free flow of information to the public in 2005 and beyond. In one
instance, as this article argues, the odds of a particular privacy
concern immediately impacting journalists are minimal. On the
other hand, the implications of the other four privacy controversies
addressed here may well have a profound and lasting effect on
reporters and the press, and on how they perform the democratic
duties mentioned at the start of this article.11

seclusion).
8
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (2004).
9
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the Media, Supporting the First
Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the Battle for Privacy, 67
ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2004).
10
Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, But You Can’t Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
2004, at A39.
11
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing the truth-seeking
and truth-telling obligations of journalists imposed by ethics codes).
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Drawing from an eclectic mix of both legislative measures and
courtroom decisions, the five privacy issues addressed in this
article are:
1. The federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004,12
signed into law on December 23, 2004 by President George
W. Bush,13 and impacting the use of miniature cameras,
camera phones, and video recorders in public places;
2. The U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2004 decision in
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish,14
which significantly expands a privacy exemption of the
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)15 in order to
protect the privacy interests of relatives of the dead;
3. The Supreme Court of Colorado’s July 2004 opinion in
Colorado v. Bryant16 protecting the privacy interest of a
complaining witness in a sexual assault case over the
media’s right to disseminate truthful and lawfully obtained
information about an event of public significance involving
basketball superstar Kobe Bryant, and the efforts of
California trial court judge Rodney S. Melville to keep
private numerous details of the sexual assault case pending
against music superstar Michael Jackson;17

12

18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005); Pub. L. No. 108-495.
See generally Bruce Alpert, La. Victim Hails Voyeur Law, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 30, 2004, at 1 (describing the new law and some
of the reasons for its enactment).
14
541 U.S. 157 (2004).
15
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004).
16
94 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2004), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1 (2004).
17
See generally Adam Liptak, Privacy Rights, Fair Trials, Celebrities and
the Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A20 (writing that “in the Jackson case,
Judge Rodney S. Melville of Santa Barbara County Superior Court has issued a
series of orders barring the release of essentially all information concerning
evidence and potential witnesses’ identities”).
13
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4. A federal district court’s August 2004 decision in
Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Companies18 refusing
to grant summary judgment for the media defendants on
multiple causes of action based on the surreptitious
recording of conversations by a producer for the television
newsmagazine 20/20; and
5. Multiple battles across the United States in 2004
involving the efforts of journalists, such as Matthew
Cooper,19 Judith Miller,20 and James Taricani,21 to keep
private the names of confidential sources after those
journalists and their news agencies were called upon in
court to reveal the sources’ identities.
When considered collectively, the five subjects analyzed in this
article, which cut across the privacy landscape, reveal a startling
and disturbing finding for working journalists—that the privacy
interests of others either prevailed or were expanded in all of the
above situations, with the lone exception being when journalists
18

32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
In re Special Counsel Investigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2004)
(denying the request of Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper to quash
subpoenas issued by Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald as part of an ongoing
investigation into the potentially illegal disclosure of the identity of CIA covert
operative Valerie Plame).
20
In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004)
(denying the motion of New York Times investigative reporter Judith Miller to
quash grand jury subpoenas served upon her as part of the ongoing investigation
into the potentially illegal disclosure of the identity of CIA covert operative
Valerie Plame).
21
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming and
upholding a civil contempt order against Taricani for refusing to give up the
name of the individual who leaked to him a surveillance videotape). See Pam
Belluck, Reporter Who Shielded Source Will Serve Sentence at Home, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A28 (describing how James Taricani, an awardwinning reporter for a Rhode Island television station, was sentenced “to six
months of home confinement for refusing to reveal who gave him an F.B.I.
videotape that was evidence in a investigation of government corruption in
Providence”).
19
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themselves asserted privacy interests in the name of gathering and
disseminating news. Parsed differently and more bluntly, privacy
rights grew except when journalists needed them to grow. The year
2004, in brief, was not a good one for journalists when confronting
legislative and judicial concerns regarding privacy interests. But
because the issues discussed here will not disappear in 2005 and
beyond, journalists and news agencies must learn from these
negative results and adopt new policies and approaches both to
newsgathering and the judicial challenges they encounter.
I. PRIVACY IN PUBLIC PLACES?: THE VIDEO VOYEURISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
In 2000, the author of this article first identified a growing
problem caused by the development of miniaturized technology
that had outpaced the current state of privacy law—the deviant and
prurient use of tiny, backpack-hidden cameras in public places to
take pictures underneath the skirts or dresses of girls and women,
and the posting of those photographs, descriptively known as
upskirts, on the World Wide Web.22 The problem from a legal
perspective was that most of the upskirting occurred in public
places—malls and parks—where, under traditional legal policy,
people simply do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy.23
As I elaborated in a book at that time:
Backpacks and bags are the precise kind of tool employed
by many so-called upskirt voyeurs. They drop a backpack
near the feet of a woman standing in line and then hope that
the covert camera, buried within but with its lens
unobstructed and pointing upward, gets a crisp shot of the
woman’s underwear or lack thereof.24
Today, five years later, the problem of upskirt voyeurism has
22

Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the
Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 469 (2000).
23
Id. at 489.
24
CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN
MODERN CULTURE 126 (2000).
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not gone away but, in fact, has been exacerbated by the rapid
growth and development of camera phones.25 As a reporter for one
newspaper observed in August 2004, “Some people have used
camera phones as technological peepholes to take photographs up
women’s skirts and post them on a growing list of upskirt and
voyeurism Web sites.”26 This statement foreshadowed a typical
instance of alleged upskirt voyeurism with regard to which
criminal charges were filed in December 2004 in Washington
State.27 In that case, a man allegedly used “a cellular telephone
camera to attempt to take pictures up a 16-year-old girl’s skirt
while she stood in a grocery checkout line.”28 According to police
accounts, the suspect, Patrick Donald Armour,
knelt down behind the girl, ostensibly to reach for a candy
bar on a bottom shelf, and held a camera-equipped cellular
phone under the girl’s skirt. A woman standing in the
checkout line ahead of the girl said she looked back and
saw Armour place his camera-phone under the girl’s skirt
twice.29
Sadly, the incident is not rare. On the other side of the country,
in Florida, a man faced criminal charges in July 2004 for allegedly
“using his camera phone to snap a picture underneath a 14-year-old
girl’s skirt.”30 That incident took place in a mall—a public place
where, traditionally, one has no reasonable expectation of
privacy—as did an incident in Texas in 2004, in which police
25

See Pui-Wing Tam, Entreaty to Camera-Phone Photographers: Please
Print, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2004, at B1 (writing that “[s]ales of camera phones
outstripped stand-alone digital cameras for the first time in 2003. This year,
research firm IDC expects 186.3 million camera phones to be sold, more than
double its projected 68.8 million for digital camera sales”).
26
Meena Thiruvengadam, Privacy Issues; The Popularity of Camera
Phones Raises Concerns About Voyeurism and the Right to Take Photos in
Public Places, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004, at 1E.
27
John Craig, Up-Skirt Voyeurism Alleged; Newport Man Faces Charge in
Checkout Line Incident, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 19, 2004, at
B1.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Virginian Charged in Florida with Voyeurism Using Camera Phone,
ASSOC. PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July 10, 2004.
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“arrested a 28-year-old Houston electrician using a digital camera
to film images under the skirts of girls as young as 10 at a
Woodlands Mall department store.”31 Such cases are more difficult
and troubling from a legal perspective than those that take place in
bathrooms and changing rooms, where victims have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and thus, redress is possible.32
But shortly before Christmas in 2004, President George W.
Bush signed into law Senate Bill 1301, a measure designed to
punish and deter such upskirt voyeurism on federal property.33 The
Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 provides in relevant
part:
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, has the intent to capture an image of a
private area of an individual without their consent, and
knowingly does so under circumstances in which the
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.34
More importantly, the new law radically changes the traditional
legal tenet that a person does not possess a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a public place. In particular, the Act defines the
phrase “under circumstances in which that individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy” to include “circumstances in
which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the
individual would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether
that person is in a public or private place.”35
31

Charlie Bier, Digital Technology a Boon to Criminals, HOUS. CHRON.,
July 15, 2004, at This Week 1.
32
While the focus of this part of the article is on voyeurism in public
places, violations of privacy through the use of miniature cameras continued in
2004 in more private places such as bathrooms. See, e.g., Michael A. Scarcella,
Detectives Trying to ID Voyeur Victims, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 24,
2004, at B1 (describing a case in Florida in which authorities allege that “[f]rom
a bathroom ceiling at a local gymnastics studio, the video camera rolled as the
teenage girls undressed”).
33
S. 1301, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted).
34
18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005).
35
Id. (emphasis added).
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It is the italicized portion of the Act cited above that breaks
with the traditional policy by granting people privacy, at least
when it comes to certain areas on their bodies,36 even if they are in
public places. The phrase “public privacy” thus is no longer an
oxymoron. In adopting a new policy of what might be considered
bodily privacy in public places, Congress has essentially borrowed
the reasoning of both the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts from a quarter-century ago and the Alabama Supreme Court
in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham37 four decades past. In
particular, a comment by the drafters of the Restatement provides
that “even in a public place . . . there may be some matters about
the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not
exhibited to the public gaze; and there still may be an invasion of
privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”38 Similarly, in
Daily Times Democrat, the Alabama high court ruled in favor of a
woman, Flora Bell Graham, who was photographed in public
outside of an amusement fun house as air jets blew up her skirt,
exposing her “from the waist down, with the exception of that
portion covered by her ‘panties.’”39 In protecting Graham, the
court wrote:
Where the status he [the plaintiff] expects to occupy is
changed without his volition to a status that is embarrassing
to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he
should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be
protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right
to privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a
public place.40
The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 in essence
recognizes the “misfortune” that overtakes the victims of high-tech
Peeping Toms in public places and the related embarrassment and
36

The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act defines the protected private areas
of the body to include “the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area,
buttocks, or female breast of that individual.” Id.
37
162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964).
38
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (emphasis
added).
39
Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476.
40
Id. at 478.
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harm that ensues from such intrusions. But how might the new law
impact journalists and their use of hidden cameras in investigative
reports when they approach people in public places? The
journalistic use of hidden cameras in public places, after all, is not
an uncommon target of invasion of privacy lawsuits.41
On its face, the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004
should have little or no effect on journalists who use hidden
cameras in public places. Why? Because the new law does not
forbid all uses of hidden cameras in public places, but only their
use to film or record “a private area of an individual without their
consent.”42 Broadcast journalists who use hidden cameras would
rarely try to capture images of the private area of a person; rather,
they would more likely attempt to capture images of deceit, graft,
and other wrongdoings by individuals or corporations in line with
the roles described in this article’s introduction.43 As Kevin M.
Goldberg, an attorney for the American Society of Newspaper
Editors, stated, “Theoretically, you never want to see a criminal
penalty imposed upon speech, but practically I believe this will
have little effect on the mainstream media.”44
The real risk for journalism, however, lies in the danger that
the new statute’s recognition of a privacy right in a public place
will be expanded by future legislation to apply to scenarios and
situations beyond those of upskirt voyeurism. If federal law now
officially recognizes a right to bodily privacy in crowded public
41

See, e.g., Deteresa v. ABC, 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1137 (1998) (involving several privacy-based causes of action for,
among other things, the use of a hidden video camera by an ABC employee to
videotape an individual, Beverly Deteresa, without her knowledge from a public
street as she stood on the doorstep of her condominium); Wilkins v. NBC, 84
Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (involving an unsuccessful claim for
intrusion into seclusion based upon the hidden camera videotaping by producers
for NBC’s investigative newsmagazine, Dateline, at an outdoor patio table at a
crowded public restaurant in Malibu, California).
42
18 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2005).
43
See supra notes 2-4 (describing the aspirational roles and goals of the
press).
44
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Congress Approves
Criminal “Video Voyeurism” Law, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/
2004/0923s1301b.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
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places such as malls, then what is to prevent it in the future from
recognizing conversational privacy in crowded public places?
People have intimate conversations in public places, after all, that
they may not believe others can hear.
What is more, groups such as the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) already claim that the current use in several major
cities of security cameras that capture images of people’s faces in
outdoor public spaces violates individual privacy rights.45 In other
words, the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 may have
opened the floodgates for the expansion of other privacy interests
in public places. In turn, it may affect the use of surveillance
cameras outdoors in public places.46 Whether this ultimately
occurs, however, remains to be seen. In the meantime, the new law
and its expansion of privacy rights to public places should have no
impact on the work of professional journalists and their camera
people.
45

See Mark F. Bonner, Parish Gets Money for Street Cameras; ACLU’s
Concerns Fail to Dissuade Sheriff, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24,
2004, at 1 (writing that a plan to install surveillance cameras in an area near
New Orleans, Louisiana, has “drawn opposition from the American Civil
Liberties Union,” and quoting Joe Cook, executive director of the ACLU in
Louisiana, for the proposition that the cameras constitute a “reckless gamble of
privacy rights that wastes tax dollars”); Doug Donovan, Camera System
Expands in City, BALT. SUN, Dec. 2, 2004, at 1B (describing the objections of
the ACLU to a network of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the Inner Harbor
district of Baltimore, Maryland, and stating that the “American Civil Liberties
Union opposes the Baltimore network, saying the camera system infringes on
privacy rights and are [sic] ineffective in fighting crime or terrorism”); Jessica
Garrison, Cameras to Keep Watch in Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at
A1 (citing the objections of the American Civil Liberties Union to the
installation of surveillance cameras on public city streets by the Los Angeles
Police Department, and quoting Ramona Ripston, executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, for the proposition that
“[t]his is creeping Big Brotherism, and it’s really disturbing. More and more, we
are losing our right to any kind of privacy”).
46
Surveillance cameras “have come under fire from the American Civil
Liberties Union, which in recent years has campaigned against them in several
cities. The organization has cited a range of objections, from skepticism about
the cameras’ ability to produce results to possible privacy violations.” Frank
Donze, Crime-Time Program, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 14, 2005,
at 1 (emphasis added).
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II. EXTENDING STATUTORY PRIVACY RIGHTS TO RELATIVES OF THE
DEAD: THE LASTING LEGACY OF VINCENT FOSTER
While the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 created a
new federal statutory privacy right and policy with regard to
certain images of people captured in public places, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in National Archives and Records
Administration v. Favish47 stretched and expanded an existing
federal statutory right of “personal privacy”48 to apply to a
“decedent’s family when the family objects to the release of
photographs showing the condition of the body at the scene of
death.”49 In brief, the case transformed a right of personal privacy
into a familial or relational privacy right, at least in relation to
death-scene photographs. As an editorial in the Plain Dealer in
Cleveland, Ohio, argued, “The high court effectively ripped out of
the Freedom of Information Act a great chunk of the public’s right
to know what its government is doing in its name.”50 The
implications for journalists of the Favish opinion, as this part of the
article argues, are both serious and far reaching. To understand
those implications, it is first necessary to understand the facts and
issues of the case.
The case centered on the efforts of Allan Favish, a California
attorney, to obtain government-taken, death-scene photographs of
Vincent Foster, Jr., former deputy counsel to President Clinton.51
Although numerous government investigations concluded that the
shooting of Foster was a suicide, Favish doubted their findings,
and he thus made a request for the photographs under the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in order to determine for
himself what might have really happened.52 Under FOIA, any
person may request copies of records from a federal government
47

541 U.S. 157 (2004).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2005).
49
Favish, 541 U.S. at 160.
50
A Feel-Bad Ruling; Supreme Court’s Emotions Get in the Way of Its
Judgment in Vince Foster Case, and the Public’s Rights Suffer, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 3, 2004, at B8.
51
Favish, 541 U.S. at 160-61.
52
Id. at 161.
48
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agency and the agency must supply it unless the information falls
within one of nine statutorily defined exempt areas.53 In this case,
the government agencies that held the Foster photographs at one
time or another included: 1) the National Park Service, as U.S.
Park Police had taken the photographs of Foster; 2) the Office of
Independent Counsel (OIC), which, under both Robert Fiske and
Kenneth Starr, had investigated Foster’s death and concluded it
was a suicide; and 3) the National Archives and Records
Administration, which took possession of the photographs at the
conclusion of the OIC’s investigation.54
Foster’s immediate relatives, however, objected to Favish’s
request for the death-scene photographs, asserting, as the Supreme
Court noted, “their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for
their own peace of mind and tranquility.”55 Specifically, Sheila
Foster Anthony, sister of Vincent Foster, wrote in an affidavit that
the release of the death-scene images of her late brother “would
constitute a painful unwarranted invasion of my privacy, my
mother’s privacy, my sister’s privacy, and the privacy of Lisa
Foster Moody (Vince’s widow), her three children, and other
members of the Foster family.”56
Foster’s relatives asserted that Exemption 7(C) of FOIA
prevented the release of the photographs. This exemption prevents
and shields the disclosure of records or information compiled for a
law enforcement purpose that “could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”57 The
battle in the U.S. Supreme Court hinged initially on the meaning of
the term “personal privacy,” with Favish emphasizing the
importance of the word “personal” and asserting that the term
should be narrowly construed to mean “the right to control
information about oneself.”58 The self in this case was Foster, and,
so went the argument of Favish, since Foster was dead, he could
53

MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
670 (6th ed. 2000).
54
Favish, 541 U.S. at 160-64.
55
Id. at 166.
56
Id. at 167.
57
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1995).
58
Favish, 541 U.S. at 165.
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not assert his own privacy interest.59 Stated differently, Favish
contended that “the individual who is the subject of the
information is the only one with a privacy interest.”60
Foster’s immediate relatives, however, asked the nation’s high
court to adopt a much broader construction of the term “personal
privacy” that would include the decedent family’s privacy
interests.61 The Supreme Court sided with the Foster family,
adopting an expansive interpretation of personal privacy and
noting that “the statutory privacy right protected by Exemption
7(C) goes beyond the common law and the Constitution.”62 Citing
a very odd mix of authorities in support of its conclusion—the
Encyclopaedia Britannica and a Greek drama by Sophocles,
among others—Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a unanimous
Court that “[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring
and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to
degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased
person who was once their own.”63 Kennedy added that the Court
had “little difficulty . . . in finding in our case law and traditions
the right of family members to direct and control disposition of the
body of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the
deceased family member’s remains for public purposes.”64 He
noted that the “well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a
family’s control over the body and death images of the deceased
has long been recognized at common law.”65
In expanding the term “personal privacy” to sweep in family
members of the deceased and in refusing to limit the term to
individuals who are the subjects of the information or images in
question, the Supreme Court also invoked a parade-of-horrors
argument. In particular, it attempted to demonstrate the evils that
might result if it ruled against Vincent Foster’s family:
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 170.
Favish, 541 U.S. at 168.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
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We are advised by the Government that child molesters,
rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals often make
FOIA requests for autopsies, photographs, and records of
their deceased victims. Our holding ensures that the privacy
interests of surviving family members would allow the
Government to deny these gruesome requests in
appropriate cases. We find it inconceivable that Congress
could have intended a definition of “personal privacy” so
narrow that it would allow convicted felons to obtain these
materials without limitations at the expense of surviving
family members’ personal privacy.66
If this is correct, then how could the Court’s finding possibly
harm the practice of journalism? Because the holding makes it
clear that the familial right of privacy outweighs the public’s
unenumerated First Amendment right to know, at least when
images of the dead are involved.
The Court’s logic has immediate implications for press
coverage of the ongoing war in Iraq, particularly with regard to
photographs of caskets of dead soldiers as they are flown home
and arrive in the United States. Images of dead American soldiers,
gruesome though they may be for some, are important for the
public to see because they bring home the reality of war; put more
bluntly, media images depicting the loss of life, through their
power to galvanize public opinion against a war, may save lives in
the future. But the reasoning of the Court in Favish would suggest
that the privacy rights of families would prevent the public from
viewing these images. Thus, if the Court’s privacy calculus is
extended beyond the reaches of FOIA Exemption 7(C), the Favish
opinion does not bode well for journalists who seek access to
information and images related to the human costs of war; in fact,
it is perilous precedent.
These issues and implications are far more than speculative. As
journalist Hal Bernton wrote in December 2004, it was the
publication of a photograph of flag-draped coffins carrying dead
American soldiers, lined up in the fuselage of an airplane, that
“rekindled debate about a Pentagon policy—sometimes waived in
66

Id. at 170.
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years past but enforced by the Bush administration—to ban media
coverage of transport of military coffins.”67 The logic in Favish,
however, supports and bolsters the U.S. Department of Defense’s
thirteen-year-old policy that “has banned photographs and videos
that show the flag-draped coffins of American soldiers”68 as they
arrive at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. In June 2004, the U.S.
Senate defeated by a 54-to-39 vote a bill that would have permitted
news photographers access to Dover Air Force Base.69 While the
ban ostensibly is designed to protect the privacy interests of the
families of the deceased soldiers,70 it has been described by at least
one critic, The New York Times’s Maureen Dowd, as “the
Pentagon’s self-serving ban.”71
The immediate implications of Favish, which took place within
the context of a FOIA case, may well come to bear on a new
FOIA-based lawsuit, filed in late 2004, that “seeks to force the
Pentagon to release photographs and videotape of coffins of
service members killed overseas and brought back to the United
States.”72 As Meredith Fuchs, one of the attorneys involved in that
suit told a reporter, “These are the kind of documents that directly
serve the core purpose of FOIA. . . . Everyone says a picture is
worth a thousand words. Well, the pictures have an impact and
help people understand what war is really about in a way that
nothing else does.”73 The question now is whether the privacy
interests of the relatives of the deceased will trump the public’s
right to know, as served by journalists. Unfortunately, the
67

Hal Bernton, Reflecting on an Image Taken, a Choice Made, a Life
Altered, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at A1.
68
Frank Harris III, America’s War Dead Should Be Shown, HARTFORD
COURANT, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11.
69
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Backs Ban on Photos of G.I. Coffins, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A17.
70
See id. (writing that “President Bush has insisted that the policy banning
the photography protects the privacy of the families of the dead”).
71
Maureen Dowd, Wolfie’s Fuzzy Math, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at
Section 4, 11.
72
George Edmonson, Suit Seeks Military Coffin Photos, ATLANTA J.CONST., Oct. 5, 2004, at A7.
73
Id.
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reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Favish militates
against the latter interest.
The decision in Favish also is troubling to journalists for a
second reason—a reason beyond its expansive interpretation of the
term “personal privacy.” As the Christian Science Monitor noted,
“The decision makes it more difficult for media organizations,
government watchdog groups, and historians to obtain certain
types of documents held in government files.”74 Specifically, the
decision creates evidentiary barriers and hurdles for reporters
requesting information under FOIA whenever Exemption 7(C) is
raised to block the release of that information. The Court in Favish
abrogated what it called “the usual rule that the citizen need not
offer a reason for requesting the information”75 and instead held
that
the person requesting the information [must] establish a
sufficient reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen must
show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a
significant one, an interest more specific than having the
information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show
the information is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise,
the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.76
This two-step test, it should be noted, somewhat mirrors two
aspects of the Supreme Court’s four-part commercial speech
doctrine, created in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Service Commission.77 In particular, that doctrine requires the
government to prove that it has a “substantial” interest before it
can restrict truthful advertising for lawful products and that this
interest is directly advanced by the regulation.78 What is different,
of course, is that the Central Hudson test imposes a burden on the
government before it can restrict speech, while the Favish test,
conversely, imposes a burden on private individuals, such as
74

Warren Richey, In Vincent Foster Case, Court Upholds Privacy,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2004, at 3.
75
541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004).
76
Id.
77
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
78
Id. at 564.

CALVERT MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC

666

6/20/2005 7:10 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

journalists and members of the public at large, before they can
obtain speech.
Favish, it should be stressed, sought the death-scene
photographs not because he harbored some prurient interest or
deviant desire in them, but rather because he doubted the
credibility and accuracy of multiple government investigations into
the death of a person, Vincent Foster, who was very closely
connected with the highest ranking government official in the
country, then-President of the United States Bill Clinton. The
Court held that in such instances in which “the public interest
being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted
negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their
duties,” the requester of information first “must produce evidence
that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged
Government impropriety might have occurred.”79
The problem with this from a requester’s perspective is that the
photographs or information being sought might be either the only
type of physical evidence that exists or the most important piece
available. As Lucy Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, remarked, “I don’t know how you can
expect requesters to prove a negative before they are entitled to a
record under the Freedom of Information Act.”80 Favish, the high
court ultimately concluded, had not met this burden; in fact, he had
“not produced any evidence that would warrant a belief by a
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might
have occurred.”81
The Supreme Court’s requirement that courts must engage in
“a meaningful evidentiary showing”82 when FOIA exemption 7(C)
privacy concerns are raised, with the burden being placed squarely
on the requester of information, clearly elevates privacy interests
above free speech interests, including the public’s right to know.
The decision thus represents a judicial blow, struck in the name of
relational or familial privacy, against journalists’—and, by
79

Favish, 541 U.S. at 173.
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Bar Release of Photos From
the Suicide of a Top Clinton Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A16.
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extension, the public’s—access to government records. Although
“Favish may be a helpful precedent for persons seeking privacy
protection from an intrusive media,”83 it is decidedly damaging to
a democratic society when applied to journalistic intrusions related
to the reporting of alleged misconduct by public officials. Thus,
while it may be possible for some simply to dismiss Favish as just
another conspiracy theorist, one cannot so easily dismiss the
speech-related implications of the case and precedent that now
bear his name.
This part of the article has demonstrated how one type of
privacy concern trumped access to government-held information in
2004. One question raised by this outcome is whether the case
reveals the judiciary’s implicit assumptions about what constitutes
worthy impositions on, in contrast to unworthy prying into,
individual privacy. Two additional cases from 2004, involving
high-profile celebrities from the worlds of music and sports,
implicate this question, similarly placing the concept of privacy
squarely in the balance. The next part of this article examines these
two cases—one centering on Michael Jackson, and the other, on
Kobe Bryant—in which the privacy interests of two high-profile
celebrities outweighed, as they did in Favish, the First Amendment
interest in the right to receive and publish information about
matters of public interest.
III. PRIVACY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: JOURNALISTIC LOSSES
IN THE KOBE BRYANT & MICHAEL JACKSON CASES
When jury selection finally began in February 2005 in the
sexual molestation case against Michael Jackson, the news and
entertainment media were out in full force, with cameras and boom
microphones at the ready, to capture and cover every courtroom
entrance and exit by the so-called King of Pop. For journalists, the
opportunity to witness the trial’s daily happenings, even in such a
circus-like atmosphere, was a welcome relief from the excessive
secrecy that had cloaked the case in 2004.
83
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Laurie Levenson, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los
Angeles and frequent media commentator,84 summed up the
massive sealing of documents in the case against Jackson,
remarking, “I’ve never seen a case with this level of secrecy.
You’d think we were dealing with the Pentagon Papers. Everyone
is filing papers in code and we’re on the eve of trial.”85 Her
sentiment was echoed by Dalglish, who wrote in a Sacramento
Bee-published commentary that the “Michael Jackson prosecution
has been conducted under a cloak of secrecy. Unbelievably, the
judge in the Jackson case has refused to even release the
indictment against the entertainer.”86 Beyond that, as another
newspaper observed, the “[l]awyers and investigators on all sides
of the case are barred from speaking to the media.”87
In the Michael Jackson case, which centers on ten different
felony counts related to the singer’s alleged molestation of a 13year-old leukemia patient in 2003 at his secluded ranch in Southern
California,88 Judge Rodney Melville justified the need for massive
privacy and the denial of the public’s right to know by citing the
singer’s constitutional right to a fair trial.89 As Melville remarked
in June 2004 in rejecting a motion to lift orders sealing records in
the case, “The court is trying to balance the First Amendment right
against the right to a fair trial. This defendant is known around the

84

Levenson, a former prosecutor, also is the William M. Rains Fellow and
Director of Loyola Law School’s Center for Ethical Advocacy. Loyola Law
School Web site, available at http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/
levenson.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005).
85
Linda Deutsch, Court Rulings Continue to Shield Evidence in Michael
Jackson Case, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRES, Jan. 4, 2005.
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Lucy Dalglish, Courts Undermine Freedom of the Press, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Aug. 22, 2004, at E3.
87
John M. Broder, From Grand Jury Leaks Comes a Clash of Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A8.
88
See generally Eric Slater & Steve Chawkins, Opening Statements in
Jackson Trial Today, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at B1.
89
See generally Martin Kasindorf, New Set of Charges Awaits Jackson,
USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2004, at A3 (writing that “Melville, citing the perils to a
fair trial that publicity could pose, has sealed document after document in the
case”).
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world and that makes it very difficult to get a fair trial.”90 The right
to a fair trial is codified in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”91
The Jackson case was not the only celebrity criminal trial in
2004, however, in which privacy interests trumped the public’s
right to know. Even more significantly, in July 2004, the Supreme
Court of Colorado upheld a prior restraint on publication against
seven media entities that had lawfully obtained accurate
information about the sexual conduct and history of the woman
who accused Los Angeles Laker Kobe Bryant of sexual assault.92
What is critical here is that while the Colorado high court
acknowledged that a “[p]rior restraint of publication is an
extraordinary remedy attended by a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity,”93 it nonetheless concluded that the privacy
interests of the accuser, as protected by a state rape shield statute,
were sufficient to overcome this presumption and the First
Amendment interests of a free press and the public’s right to
know.94 The editors of the Denver Post opined in an editorial that
the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision was “an impermissible
encroachment on the First Amendment. It was an effort to balance
First Amendment and privacy concerns, a delicate task. But the
decision was one of flawed logic that would set a bad precedent.”95
In referencing the decision’s impact on the press, University of
Colorado Law Professor Paul Campos stated, “We’re not talking

90

Michelle Caruso, Jax Case Secrets to Stay Off-Limits, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), June 26, 2004, at 6.
91
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is also applicable to the
states by incorporation. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
92
People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2004), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1
(2004).
93
Id. at 628.
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Id. at 628-32.
95
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21, 2004, at B-06.

CALVERT MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC

670

6/20/2005 7:10 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

about a chilling effect, we’re talking about a freezing effect.”96
While the criminal case against Bryant eventually was dropped,97
the prior restraint precedent in Colorado remains on the books. It
thus is important to understand what happened in that case and
how privacy triumphed over journalists’ ability to report truthful
news of public interest.
The complex prior restraint issues in the criminal case against
Kobe Bryant all began because of simple human errors and the
push of a button on a computer. In particular, a court reporter
mistakenly emailed to seven news organizations transcripts of an
in camera pretrial proceeding conducted by the trial court judge to
determine the relevancy, if any, of the prior or subsequent sexual
conduct of the woman who accused Bryant of rape.98 The notation
“IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS” was marked on every page of
the transcripts, which were mistakenly sent out over the Internet
“because the court reporter maintained an electronic list for media
entities subscribing to transcripts of the public proceedings in the
case.”99 The news organizations thus became the fortunate
recipients of accurate information that would either confirm or
deny rumors about the complaining witness’s sexual history that
had circulated in the court of public opinion and on the World
Wide Web.
When the error was called to the attention of trial court judge
Terry Ruckriegle, however, he “ordered the recipients to delete or
destroy their copies and prohibited them from reporting the
contents.”100 The order was immediately appealed directly to the
Colorado Supreme Court by the media outlets on the grounds that
it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.101 The order at
issue before the high court of Colorado provided:
96

Jeff Kass, Case Sparks Debate About Key Principles, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS (Denver), Aug. 26, 2004, at 8K.
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It has come to the Court’s attention that the in camera
portions of the hearings in this matter on the 21st and 22nd
were erroneously distributed. These transcripts are not for
public dissemination. Anyone who has received these
transcripts is ordered to delete and destroy any copies and
not reveal any contents thereof, or be subject to contempt
of Court.102
The Colorado Supreme Court was forced to weigh the privacy
interests of Bryant’s accuser against the First Amendment interests
of a free press. The precedent in support of the news media was
clear. The U.S. Supreme Court held a quarter-century ago that “if a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a
state interest of the highest order.”103 It was a rule the Court
affirmed and applied as recently as 2001.104 As applied in the
Bryant situation, the news media had lawfully obtained the truthful
transcripts about a matter of clear public concern that had attracted
massive media attention.
Weighed against this precedent, however, was the interest “in
providing a confidential evidentiary proceeding under the rape
shield statute, because such hearings protect victims’ privacy,
encourage victims to report sexual assault, and further the
prosecution and deterrence of sexual assault.”105 Under Colorado’s
rape shield statute, the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of an
alleged sexual assault victim is presumed to be irrelevant unless
the judge determines that one of several specified exceptions
applies.106 Although the trial court judge in Bryant’s case
ultimately found that the accuser’s sexual conduct during a
seventy-two-hour period prior to her medical examination at a
hospital after the alleged assault by Bryant was relevant and
102
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admissible,107 the transcript of the in camera hearing on the issue
remained sealed.
To weigh the competing interests and to determine the
constitutionality of the trial judge’s prior restraint order, a majority
of the Colorado Supreme Court fashioned a three-part test that
asked whether:
1. the state of Colorado had an interest of the highest order
that would justify a prior restraint;
2. the restraint was the narrowest available remedy to
protect the alleged interest of the highest order; and
3. the prior restraint was “necessary to protect against an
evil that is great and certain, would result from the
reportage, and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive
measures.”108
In a 4-3 decision, a majority of the Colorado Supreme Court on
July 19, 2004 applied this three-pronged approach and upheld that
part of the trial court’s order that prevented the media from
revealing the contents of the sealed documents, emphasizing that
the state’s interests of “the highest order in this case not only
involve the victim’s privacy interest, but also the reporting and
prosecution of this and other sexual assault cases.”109 The majority
reasoned that “the harms in making these in camera judicial
proceedings public would be great, certain, and devastating to the
victim and to the state. These harms justify the remedy we fashion
in this case.”110 To assure that the order was as narrow as possible,
107

See Kirk Johnson, Judge Limiting Sex-Life Shield at Bryant Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2004, at A1.
[T]he judge ruled that the defense could introduce direct or
circumstantial evidence about any sexual conduct on the woman’s part
in the 72 hours preceding her physical examination by doctors at a
hospital in Glenwood Springs, Colo., on July 1, 2003. The incident
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the majority struck down that portion of Judge Ruckriegle’s order
requiring the media to delete or destroy the documents it had
received, and it noted that “[p]ublication of information the media
has obtained or obtains by its own investigative capacities is not
limited by the District Court’s order or our judgment, even though
such information may also be spoken of or referred to in the
transcripts.”111
Three members of Colorado’s high court signed off on a
vigorous dissent, written by Justice Michael Bender, contending
that
two striking facts about this case make it obvious that the
prior restraint issued by the district court is an
unconstitutional violation of the freedom of the press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. First, most of the
private details of the alleged victim’s sexual conduct
around the time of the alleged rape, which is also the
subject matter of the confidential hearings in this case, are
already available through public court documents and other
sources and have been widely reported by the media.
Second, the media did nothing wrong in obtaining the
transcripts. Under well-established prior restraint doctrine,
these two factors alone require this Court to direct the
district court to vacate its order immediately.112
The dissent’s passionate argument, however, failed to carry the
day in court, and the majority allowed the prior restraint to remain
in place. The decision shocked First Amendment scholars such as
Erwin Chemerinsky, who remarked, “This is a court order
prohibiting publication. Unless the Supreme Court dramatically
changes the law of the First Amendment, this decision can’t
stand.”113
But, unfortunately for free press advocates, it did. Although the
media quickly asked the U.S. Supreme Court to step in to prevent
the enforcement of the prior restraint, the nation’s high court
111
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refused to stay the order, in part because of timing issues.114 Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote that
the trial court’s determination as to the relevancy of the
rape shield material will significantly change the
circumstances that have led to this application [for a stay of
the prior restraint]. As a result of that determination, the
trial court may decide to release the transcripts at issue here
in their entirety, or to release some portions while redacting
others. Their release . . . is imminent.115
In essence, the Supreme Court passed on the issue, but strongly
suggested that the trial court judge quickly review and release as
much of the transcripts, redacted if necessary, as possible. Justice
Breyer also wrote that the news organizations could re-file in two
days’ time for a stay with the U.S. Supreme Court if the trial court
judge had not, by that time, made his findings regarding which
portions of the transcripts could be released.116 In response to
Breyer’s rather forceful encouragement, Judge Ruckriegle ordered
the prosecution and defense “to work together to produce an edited
version of disputed transcripts that can be released to the
public.”117
The media entities involved ultimately dropped a second
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2004 after the trial
judge unsealed large portions of the transcripts of the closed-door
hearings about the sexual history of Bryant’s accuser.118 One
reason the appeal was dropped, however, was to avoid “the
possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court might uphold Colorado’s
high court, setting a national precedent in favor of do-not-publish
orders.”119 Thus, while the transcripts were made public in the
Bryant case, “the greater battle over prior restraints remains.”120
114
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In summary, in 2004, when it came to sexual assault cases
involving high-profile public figures such as Kobe Bryant and
Michael Jackson, privacy and secrecy trumped the public’s right to
know and the First Amendment interest in a free press. This does
not bode well for the press in 2005 and beyond. As media reporter
Tim Rutten observed in the Los Angeles Times, “[T]he precedent
established in the Bryant case ominously stands in Colorado.”121
Why are trial court judges such as Terry Ruckriegle and
Rodney Melville now coming down squarely on the side of privacy
and against the First Amendment interests of the public and
journalists? Could there be factors at play here besides legal rules
and principles (such as the right to a fair trial and rape shield
statutes) that might be influencing their opinions?122 One
extrajudicial, contextual variable that might be playing an unseen
role is a possible growing sentiment that the prying and peering
behavior of the news media that has, in part, given rise to our
voyeuristic culture has simply gone too far.123 In fact, Michael
Jackson’s attorneys, in arguing for certain information to be kept
sealed, wrote that media coverage of the case was “voyeuristic and
entertainment-related”124 and that the press was simply seeking
POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at B-02.
121
Tim Rutten, Regarding Media; Secrecy Proves Costly, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2004, at E1.
122
The law often is influenced by variables that may have nothing to do
with legal rules. Benjamin N. Cardozo, the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
wrote more than eighty years ago that the forces that influence judges in their
opinions
are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface,
however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be
disclaimed. . . . Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes
and dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of instincts
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether
he be litigant or judge.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 178 (M.E. Hall ed., 1947).
123
See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND
PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE 133-37 (2000) (detailing the media’s voyeuristic
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“material that might sell magazines or provide higher ratings
during sweeps week on television.”125 What the author of this
article has elsewhere identified as the voyeurism value in First
Amendment jurisprudence126 may finally have met its match in the
form of celebrity cases involving sexual assault.
Parsed differently, what occurred in 2004 may well represent
the start of an unfortunate wave of judicial backlash in response to
prior journalistic indiscretions or out of fear of future foibles. A
recent article in the ABA Journal on celebrity cases and the sealing
of records, including those involving Kobe Bryant and Michael
Jackson, noted how some people “say increasing numbers of
competing news organizations and the rise of tabloid journalism
have overwhelmed courts and forced judges’ hands.”127
Or could it be that the judges’ decisions against the news media
reflect a much broader and pervasive lack of public trust in the
news media?128 Put differently, if the public does not trust the news
media, then why should Judge Melville—a member of that same
public—trust news organizations with the sensitive sexual
information at issue in the Michael Jackson case? After all, a
survey conducted in 2004 on behalf of the Project for Excellence
in Journalism found that the “public believes that news
organizations are operating largely to make money, and that the
journalists who work for these organizations are primarily
motivated by professional ambition and self-interest.”129 It would
be distressing for journalists, of course, to believe that they in part
brought this situation on themselves, but that may be the case.
Ultimately, regardless of the actual reasons, the Michael
Jackson and Kobe Bryant cases in 2004 represent triumphs of
privacy over a free press and the public’s right to know. The next
125

Steve Chawkins, Jackson Lawyers Scold Media for Seeking Records,
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B6.
126
Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273 (1999).
127
John Gibeaut, Celebrity Justice, ABA J., Jan. 2005, at 42, 47.
128
Cf. Mark Jurkowitz, Public’s Cynicism About Media Has Become A
Pressing Concern, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2004, at C1 (writing that “public
distrust of the news media appears to be at a dangerously high level”).
129
Id.
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part of this article illustrates, using the opinion of another court in
2004 in a decidedly non-celebrity setting, some of the specific,
privacy-intrusive journalistic practices that may result in legal
liability. Despite the different setting and players in this next case,
privacy again prevailed in court. In contrast to the Jackson and
Bryant cases, in which cameras were a pervasive presence outside
of the public courthouses, the case discussed in the next part of the
article poses ramifications for the covert use of cameras and
microphones by journalists inside of private places.
IV. UNDERCOVER JOURNALISM AND PRIVACY: SOME LESSONS
FROM 20/20 IN 2004
Los Angeles-based attorney Neville Johnson has made a name
for himself as a litigator by suing news media organizations on
behalf of people who claim that their privacy interests were
invaded by duplicitous and invasive newsgathering techniques.130
He successfully posited such an argument before the Supreme
Court of California in Sanders v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.131 In that case, which examined the use of hidden
cameras and microphones, Johnson coaxed from the court a
decision holding that a plaintiff need not prove a complete
expectation of privacy to recover under the tort of intrusion into
seclusion.132
In 2004, Johnson was at it once again, this time in federal
court, in a case called Turnbull v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.133 The case pivoted on the surreptitious recording
of both images and voices by an undercover ABC producer for a
20/20 newsmagazine segment called “Pay to Play” that aired in
November 2002. The lawsuit focused “on the alleged intrusion of
130

See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 9 (profiling Johnson and
providing the transcript of an in-depth, first-person interview with him).
131
20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999).
132
Id. at 916 (holding that “[t]here are degrees and nuances to societal
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one expects
in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation
unreasonable as a matter of law”).
133
32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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privacy rather than the broadcast of the program,”134 as the
plaintiffs did not assert a cause of action for defamation.135
In August 2004, U.S. District Court Judge S. James Otero
issued an order rejecting ABC’s motion for summary judgment on
a number of privacy-based causes of action filed by Johnson and
his partner, Brian Rishwain, thus allowing much of the case to
proceed to a jury trial.136 Although the plaintiffs ultimately lost at
trial on October 28, 2004,137 there are several significant aspects of
Judge Otero’s summary judgment ruling that bode well for privacy
advocates and that may impact and limit future hidden-camera and
hidden-microphone investigations by journalists. In particular,
Judge Otero’s decision permitting causes of action based on
eavesdropping,138 intrusion into seclusion,139 trespass,140 and
134

Id. at 2446.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 44 (Deering 2004) (defining defamation in
California to include both libel and slander).
136
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
137
See E-mail from Jim Ryan, associate attorney for Johnson & Rishwain,
LLP, to Clay Calvert, Associate Professor of Communications and Law at The
Pennsylvania State University (Jan. 18, 2005, 14:39:59 PST) (on file with
author) (setting forth the date of the jury verdict, and noting that a motion for a
new trial had been filed and was, at that time, under consideration).
138
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (Deering 2004). This section, which applies to
the secretive recording of confidential communications, provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties
to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic
amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the
confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on
among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a
telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($ 2,500), or
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state
prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
Id.
139
See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Invasion
of Privacy: Intrusion, First Amendment Handbook, available at
http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/c02p02.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2005)
(describing the intrusion tort).
140
See Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
135

CALVERT MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC

6/20/2005 7:10 PM

JOURNALISM AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

679

physical and constructive invasion of privacy under California’s
anti-paparazzi statute141 is significant because it:
• identifies a number of specific, objective indicators or
signals that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
certain scenarios when hidden recording devices are used;
• reflects an expansive interpretation of both the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Sanders regarding privacy
expectations142 and the state’s anti-paparazzi law; and
(defining the tort of trespass under California law).
141
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering 2004). The law was enacted after the
death of Princess Diana and amid a public furor about the actions of so-called
paparazzi. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News
Coverage: How the Media Harm Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215 (2002) (discussing the evolution of antipaparazzi legislation). California’s anti-paparazzi statute has two key
components—one for physical invasions of privacy, the other for constructive
invasions of privacy, with the former providing:
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant
knowingly enters onto the land of another without permission or
otherwise committed a trespass, in order to physically invade the
privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff
engaging in a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion
occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (a) (Deering 2004).
In addition to targeting physical invasions of privacy on personal or familial
activities, the statute also restricts constructive invasions of privacy by
providing:
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial
activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory
enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if
this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not
have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory
enhancing device was used.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (b) (Deering 2004).
142
See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
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• contains dicta suggesting that First Amendment protection
for the use of hidden cameras is limited, especially when
journalist-defendants freely admit during discovery that
such surveillance techniques were not necessary to report
the story in question.
To better understand the potential implications of the Turnbull
decision, however, it is first important to briefly review the
underlying facts of the case. The 20/20 segment at issue focused on
the activities of certain “casting workshops” in the Los Angeles
area.143 The gist of the story was that these workshops for aspiring
actors had very little educational or learning component to them,
but instead, were merely paid opportunities for actors to meet and
appear before casting directors. As such, the plaintiffs, most of
whom were aspiring actors, contended that the 20/20 segment
“made them look like ‘whores,’ or desperate losers on the fringe of
the acting community in Los Angeles.”144 But because the causes
of action focused on how the information for the segment was
gathered rather than on the segment itself, the gravamen of the
complaint was that the “[p]laintiffs object[ed] to the very fact that
their presence at the workshop was recorded”145 and that private
and embarrassing conversations were recorded.
To obtain footage and audio at these workshops, ABC producer
Yoruba Richen went undercover and attended several workshops,
paying an admission fee to enter as if she too were an aspiring
actress.146 It is undisputed that “Richen’s primary purpose in
attending the workshops was to do a story on the workshops, not to
practice her acting.”147 It also was undisputed that “Richen did not
tell anyone at the workshops that she was wearing a hidden camera
or planned to wear a hidden camera.”148
While at the workshops, Richen recorded performances by the
actors doing scenes for the casting directors and, more importantly,
143

Turnbull v. ABC, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442, 2445 (C.D. Cal.

2004).
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 2445-46.
Id. at 2447.
Id. at 2446.
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2447.
Id.
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secretly recorded “conversations between actors while they were
waiting for performances to begin,”149 including “personal
conversations between workshop participants to which Richen was
not a party.”150 In one instance, she recorded a plaintiff-actor
“making an offensive and overtly sexual comment to”151 another
plaintiff-actor, while in another situation she captured one
plaintiff-actor expressing something that she did not want the
casting directors to know. Beyond this, Richen “even filmed a
journey into the womens’ [sic] lavatory.”152 The tape also captured
conversations “overheard from across the room as two people
talk[ed] in a corner, or while their backs [were] turned to Ms.
Richen, apparently unaware that an ABC News reporter [was]
recording their every word.”153
With these undisputed facts in mind, one can better understand
the three significant aspects of Judge Otero’s opinion identified
earlier in this section of the article. First, in holding that the
plaintiffs had reasonable expectations of confidentiality and
privacy in their communications at the workshops, the judge
articulated a number of objective indicators of privacy that were
manifested in the setting, the situation, and the behavior of the
plaintiffs. This was all part of what Judge Otero called “a common
sense approach”154 to privacy. These factors, which, if heeded,
should help journalists avoid future lawsuits for privacy invasions,
include:
• Plaintiffs’ Body Language: In particular, in finding a
conversational privacy expectation, Judge Otero noted that
two of the plaintiffs “had their back[s] turned to”155 ABC’s
producer, Richen, while the plaintiffs were talking among
themselves.
• Plaintiffs’ Distance and Location from Defendant: Judge
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Id.
Id.
Id.
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2447.
Id.
Id. at 2453 n.8.
Id. at 2451.
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Otero specifically observed that defendant “Richen was
standing across the room”156 from the plaintiffs at the time
she recorded one of their conversations. It also appeared to
make a difference to the judge that the plaintiffs, during
some conversations, were “in a corner”157 of a room.
• Content of the Communications: Judge Otero’s opinion
suggests that if the plaintiffs are engaged in a conversation
that includes potentially embarrassing or offensive remarks,
it may signal that they did not expect their conversation to
be recorded. In particular, he emphasized that, in one
instance, a plaintiff made an overtly sexual comment that
“probably was not for Ms. Richen’s benefit.”158
In addition, in another conversation recorded by Richen, a
different plaintiff, Sharon Johnston, specifically said, “But
they don’t have to know that.”159 For Judge Otero, this
statement made it “clear”160 that the plaintiff “did not want
her conversation disseminated outside of the intended
audience.”161 As the judge wrote, “By stating ‘they don’t
have to know that,’ Johnston was signaling her expectation
of privacy.”162
• Number of People in the Setting: In finding a privacy
expectation, Judge Otero observed that the workshops
“were small, consisting of 10 to 20 people,” and in many
instances when conversations were recorded, “there were
only two or three people in a room.”163
• Custom of the Activities in the Setting: The very nature of
the educational workshop at issue in the case also appeared
to play an important role in the judge’s privacy calculus. In
particular, Judge Otero wrote that “[i]t is not difficult to
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Id.
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2451.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2451.
Id.
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imagine a litany of classroom or workshop settings where
the students might reasonably expect privacy.”164 In
important dicta, Otero observed:
Customarily, in law school and undergraduate
university lectures, students must ask for the
instructor’s permission prior to recording university
lectures. Closer to the point, if a group of aspiring
authors decided to attend a seminar with a writer in
residence at a local university in order to obtain
feedback and criticism regarding unfinished work, it
would probably be reasonable for them to assume their
activities, readings, and the instructor’s comments,
were not being overheard by a person who was not
similarly situated; let alone being recorded by a
journalist.165
What is interesting here is the suggestion that, in certain
learning environments in which people voluntarily expose
themselves to the risk of criticism from others (instructors
or classmates) for the ultimate purpose of improving
themselves based on feedback, they do not voluntarily
expose themselves to a risk of recordation of their activities
and conversations.
• Admission and Entrance to the Setting: Judge Otero
pointed out in his analysis of privacy expectations on the
tort of intrusion that “the workshops were closed to the
general public. To gain entry, a prospective participant had
to audition, pay an entry fee and check-in.”166 He added
that “[t]he workshops took place in a private room of a
private building few actors know about.”167 In the judge’s
view, the restrictions on the program’s accessibility
seemingly added to the degree of privacy expected by
workshop participants.

164
165
166
167

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2453 n.9.
Id.
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Viewed collectively, the abovementioned laundry list of
privacy factors that can be distilled from Judge Otero’s opinion
should prove useful for journalists considering whether and when
to use hidden cameras and microphones. Indeed, journalists should
seriously consider incorporating these variables into their
newsgathering policies and practices.
In addition to these privacy variables, Judge Otero’s opinion is
significant in its expansive reading of the Supreme Court of
California’s holding in Sanders v. American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.168 In Sanders, the California high court held that
“[a] person who lacks a reasonable expectation of complete
privacy in a conversation because it could be seen and overheard
by coworkers (but not the general public) may nevertheless have a
claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion based on a television
reporter’s covert videotaping of that conversation.”169
Judge Otero extended this logic from the workplace setting of
Sanders, which involved the tele-psychic industry, to the
educational and classroom setting of Turnbull. This extension
allowed Otero to conclude, in part, that the plaintiffs “could not
have expected, as they talked amongst themselves in the corners or
against the wall of the classroom, in their chairs awaiting class to
begin, much less the ladies [sic] room, that a reporter was covertly
recording their conversations.”170
Judge Otero adopted a similarly expansive construction of
California’s anti-paparazzi law and, in particular, its requirement
that the alleged privacy invasion must relate to “the plaintiff
engaging in a personal or familial activity.”171 Clearly the factual
situation at issue in Turnbull did not involve “familial activity”;
indeed, the workshops were all about acting and meeting casting
directors. Thus, to receive the protection of California’s antipaparazzi law, the plaintiffs’ conduct at the casting workshops
would have to be characterized as “personal activity.” The
defendants contended in their summary judgment motion that ABC
168
169
170
171

20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999).
Id. at 923.
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2454.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (Deering 2004) (emphasis added).
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producer Richen “did not record personal activity.”172 The judge,
however, rejected this contention. In allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed to trial on this statutory cause of action, Judge Otero ruled
that the defendants “recorded personal conversations and other
matters without permission.”173 This expansive reading of the antipaparazzi statute stretches the term “activity”174 to include
conversations. The judge’s view thus rejects the existence of a
conduct-versus-speech dichotomy that separates and distinguishes
an activity from a conversation. Under this interpretation, personal
conversations, not just personal activities, fall within the ambit of
California Civil Code Section 1708.8. This interpretation
represents an important victory for privacy advocates.
Finally, the third significant aspect of Judge Otero’s summary
judgment ruling in Turnbull is the following statement made by the
judge: “[T]here is no point in according First Amendment
protection in the instant case because Defendants freely admit that
they would have gone ahead with the same story even if secret
camera footage was unavailable.”175
If this proposition really is true, as Judge Otero believes it is,
then Turnbull’s implications for hidden-camera journalists and
producers are profound: if the same story can be told regardless of
whether hidden cameras are used, then journalists should not
expect the First Amendment to come to their rescue if they are
sued for invasions of privacy based on the use of hidden cameras.
Likewise, journalists and producers should never admit in
depositions or affidavits that they could have told the same story or
would have done the same story without the hidden surveillance
devices. Indeed, Judge Otero cited the deposition testimony of
Brian Ross, the chief investigative correspondent at ABC and “one
of the individuals who decided to do the story and decided to use
hidden cameras for the program,”176 as proof that “Ross would not
have scrapped the story if he could not have used hidden
172
173
174
175
176

Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2456.
Id. (emphasis added).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering 2004) (emphasis added).
Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2458 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2448.
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cameras.”177 To some extent, then, ABC was done in by its own
words.
Judge Otero’s statement further suggests that the First
Amendment will come to journalists’ defense in such situations if
hidden cameras were the only way to tell the story. This forces
news producers and in-house media counsel to make very tough
choices about how to cover stories and whether to risk the use of
hidden cameras. Turnbull advises that a true journalistic and legal
cost-benefit analysis is in order for those in the newsrooms and
executive suites of the broadcast networks.
In summary, Judge Otero’s summary judgment ruling in
Turnbull, although of precedential value today in only one federal
district court, contains reasoning, logic, and analysis that, if
adopted by other courts, may have significant ramifications for
journalism policies and practices in the future. In the interim, the
laundry list of privacy-expectation signals identified by the judge
should prove useful for journalists in guiding their own conduct in
future investigative-report scenarios.
V. PRIVACY IN SOURCE-REPORTER RELATIONSHIPS:
THE DIFFICULTY OF KEEPING CONFIDENCES IN 2004
This article so far has illustrated how privacy concerns often
prevailed in 2004 against the interests of both journalists and the
public’s right to know. It thus is more than a little bit ironic that,
when journalists in 2004 asserted their own privacy interests—in
particular, the right to keep private and secret the names of their
confidential sources—they were thoroughly rebuffed and rebuked
by the judiciary. In fact, as the author of this article and a colleague
wrote in a newspaper commentary in November 2004, “[t]he list of
reporters now facing jail time for refusing to disclose a source’s
identity grows longer each day.”178
Chief among those journalists was Jim Taricani, an
investigative television journalist for NBC-affiliate WJAR,
177

Id. at 2458.
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Keeping Public Confidences; It’s
Time for a Federal Shield Law Protecting Journalists from Source Revelation,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2004, at A-21.
178

CALVERT MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC

6/20/2005 7:10 PM

JOURNALISM AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

687

Channel 10, in Providence, Rhode Island, who was held in both
civil and criminal contempt in November 2004.179 In particular,
Taricani was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to reveal
the identity of the person who leaked to him a copy of an FBI
surveillance videotape showing a bribe being accepted by a
Providence city official.180 The tape, which Taricani’s station aired
on February 1, 2001,181 had been under seal by a court, and thus,
the person who leaked it to the reporter violated a court order.182
U.S. District Court Judge Ernest C. Torres appointed Marc DeSisto
as a special prosecutor to try “to find out who gave Taricani the
secret videotape.”183
Taricani’s November criminal conviction followed a decision
earlier that same year by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirming a civil contempt ruling and holding that Taricani
did not have a First Amendment privilege or right to refuse to
reveal his source to DeSisto.184 The decision was not surprising.
Although thirty-one states now have shield laws that grant
journalists varying degrees of protection against testifying about
certain confidential information in their possession,185 there is no
179

See generally Lynne Tuohy, Reporter Convicted; Shielded Source,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 19, 2004, at A1 (providing an excellent overview of
the battles Taricani faced for protecting his source).
180
Pam Belluck, Reporter Is Found Guilty for Refusal to Name Source,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at A24.
181
Tuohy, supra note 179, at A1.
182
See Eileen McNamara, Journalists Under Attack, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
21, 2004, at B1 (writing that “[w]hoever leaked the videotape to Taricani,
though, did so in violation of a court order that all such materials were to be
sealed”).
183
Tracy Breton, Taricani Told to Reveal Source or Risk Prison,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 5, 2004, at A-01.
184
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004).
185
See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (setting forth California’s shield
law); see generally DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, 2005-2006 EDITION
MASS MEDIA LAW 390-93 (2005) (discussing state shield laws); Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An
Introduction, available at http://www.rcfp.org/cgi-local/privilege/item. cgi?i=
intro (last visited Jan. 16, 2005).
[Thirty-one] states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes—
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federal shield law to protect source privacy; in fact, in the only
instance in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered a
possible constitutional privilege, the Court rejected a First
Amendment privilege for journalists to refuse to testify before
grand juries.186
After the appellate court’s ruling, Judge Torres began fining
Taricani $1,000 per day, hoping that the civil contempt remedy
would persuade Taricani to give up his source.187 Some $85,000 in
paid fines later, Torres switched tactics from civil to criminal
contempt.188
Why did Taricani refuse to reveal his source to the special
prosecutor? As the Emmy Award-winning journalist explained
outside the courthouse after his conviction,
I wish all my sources could be on the record, but when
people are afraid, a promise of confidentiality may be the
only way to get the information to the public, and in some
cases, to protect the well-being of the source. I made a

shield laws—that give journalists some form of privilege against
compelled production of confidential or unpublished information. The
laws vary in detail and scope from state to state, but generally give
greater protection to journalists than the state or federal constitution,
according to many courts.
Id.
186

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See In re Special
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (writing that “[i]n Branzburg, the
Supreme Court flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter’s
privilege for confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or
of a newly hewn common law privilege”).
187
See Tracy Breton, Taricani Could Face Harsher Sanctions,
PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 30, 2004, at A-01 (describing the court-imposed, $1,000per-day fine on Taricani, and how it was being paid everyday by a check
“delivered to the clerk of the U.S. District Court—written from a bank account
of Channel 10 investigative reporter Jim Taricani”).
188
See Belluck, supra note 180, at A24 (writing that “Taricani was fined
$1,000 for each day he continued to refuse to name his source” and, when he
refused to relent “after he had paid $85,000—for which he was reimbursed by
his employer—Judge Torres changed the civil contempt case into a criminal
contempt case”).
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promise to my source, which I intend to keep.189
Taricani’s promise of privacy to his source, however,
ultimately resulted in six months of home confinement—the
sentence Judge Torres meted out in December 2004 for the
criminal contempt conviction.190
Taricani was not the only journalist under a determined judicial
assault in 2004 aimed at compelling the revelation of his sources.
In fact, as a reporter for the Boston Globe summarized the situation
in late 2004:
This past summer, five reporters were found in contempt
for refusing to disclose sources used in reporting on Wen
Ho Lee, the former nuclear scientist who was the suspect in
an espionage case.191 And leaked information from the
BALCO steroid grand jury investigation could leave some
Bay Area reporters facing penalties for not revealing their
sources.192
In the BALCO situation, which centered on alleged steroid use
by individuals such as baseball superstars Barry Bonds and Jason
Giambi, U.S. Attorney Kevin V. Ryan asked journalists from the
San Francisco Chronicle to reveal their sources for leaked grand
jury testimony.193 By early 2005, the Chronicle’s editor, Phil
Bronstein, maintained that the newspaper would not give up its
confidential sources, stating that “[t]he press has certain
responsibilities in society, but one of them is not to enforce the
provisions of the federal grand jury system. Obviously, there are
people who disagree with that, including the Justice Department.
189

Id.
W. Zachary Malinowski, Taricani Won’t Appeal Punishment,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 22, 2004, at B-03.
191
Lee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004). The five
journalists in that case were Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times, H. Josef
Hebert of the Associated Press, Jeff Gerth and James Risen of The New York
Times, and Pierre Thomas, a former CNN reporter who now works for ABC
News. Id. at 27 n.1.
192
Mark Jurkowitz, Journalists Push for a State Shield Law, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2004, at D1.
193
John M. Broder, From Grand Jury Leaks Comes a Clash of Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A8.
190
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But that’s not the view from here.”194
Two other major cases from 2004 involving the journalistic
desire to keep private the identities of sources both pivot on the
question of who leaked and disclosed the name of covert CIA
operative Valerie Plame in July 2003 to several members of the
media, including Robert Novak.195 Novak later blew Plame’s cover
by printing her name in his syndicated column that same month.
Novak cited his sources for the scoop on Plame’s employment as
“two senior administration officials,”196 neither of whom he
identified. It is a violation of federal law to reveal the names of
covert CIA agents, and the Justice Department named a special
prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald, to conduct a grand
jury investigation into who leaked Plame’s name to Novak. With
Novak refusing to tell anyone whether he had even spoken with the
special prosecutor or was cooperating with the government
investigation,197 Fitzgerald soon began “aggressively taking on
other journalists who reported on the story.”198 Among those
journalists was Time magazine’s Matthew Cooper and, although
she never wrote a story on the matter, The New York Times’s
Judith Miller.199 In November 2004, U.S. District Court Judge
Thomas F. Hogan refused to quash a subpoena served on Cooper
194

Id.
See generally Lorne Manly & Adam Liptak, At Leak Inquiry’s Center, a
Circumspect Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at A18 (providing a
thorough overview of the facts and legal issues in the dispute).
196
See Adam Liptak, Judges Skeptical of First Amendment Protection for
Reporters in C.I.A. Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A28 (“Robert
Novak, the syndicated columnist, was the first to disclose Ms. Plame’s identity
publicly, in a column published on July 14, 2003. He had been told, he wrote, by
‘two senior administration officials’ seeking to cast doubt on an opinion column
by Ms. Plame’s husband, Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former diplomat.”).
197
See Charles Duhigg, Media Law; Robert Novak: How Does He Stay Out
of Jail, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at Opinion M6 (describing how Novak has
managed to escape the same wrath that has faced Matthew Cooper and Judith
Miller).
198
Richard B. Schmitt, The Nation; Prosecutor’s Lips Still Sealed in Probe
of Leaked Information, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A10.
199
See Punishing the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A28 (writing
that Miller “never wrote a single article about the Plame controversy”).
195
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and Time, writing:
Mr. Cooper and Time have no privilege based in the First
Amendment or common law, qualified or otherwise,
excusing them from providing documents to or testifying
before the grand jury in this matter. Therefore, Mr. Cooper
and Time must fulfill their obligations to answer valid
subpoenas issued to them by a grand jury acting in good
faith.200
This decision followed an earlier August 2004 order holding
Cooper in civil contempt and fining Time $1,000 per day until it
handed over the subpoenaed documents.201 Judith Miller’s motion
to quash the subpoena of Fitzgerald also was rejected by Judge
Hogan.202 Similar to his finding with Matthew Cooper, Judge
Hogan opined that Miller “has no privilege, based in the First
Amendment or common law, qualified or otherwise, excusing her
from testifying before the grand jury in this matter. . . . Ms. Miller
must fulfill her obligation, shared by all citizens, to answer a valid
subpoena issued to her by a grand jury acting in good faith.”203
With both Cooper and Miller facing up to eighteen months in jail
for refusing to disclose their sources, the reporters and their news
organizations took their case to a federal appellate court in
December 2004.204 The three-judge panel seemed skeptical during
oral argument of granting a privilege to Cooper and Miller,205 and
in February of 2005, it ruled against the journalistic duo.206 The
200

In re Special Counsel Investigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.D.C.

2004).
201

In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2004).
In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004).
203
Id. at 19.
204
See Richard B. Schmitt, A Sign of Hope for Reporters in CIA Leak Case,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A22 (describing the arguments before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia).
205
See Carol D. Leonnig, Judges Weigh Press Freedoms, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 2004, at A11 (describing how “Judge David B. Sentelle grew visibly
irritated as he repeatedly asked longtime First Amendment lawyer Floyd
Abrams to explain how Cooper and Miller’s circumstances differed from those
of the Kentucky reporter”).
206
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 04-3138, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2494
202
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appellate court wrote that “there is no First Amendment privilege
protecting the evidence sought, but no decision had been reached
by the end of the year,”207 and it added that “if any such common
law privilege exists, it is not absolute, and in this case has been
overcome by the filings of the Special Counsel with the District
Court.”208
In situations such as those involving Taricani, Cooper, and
Miller, the First Amendment interest in privacy of information—
privacy of source identity, in particular—is clear. As veteran media
defense attorney James C. Goodale observed, what journalists such
as “Taricani are fighting for is the right to do their job. They
cannot do it without confidential sources.”209 And what is that job?
New York Times columnist William Safire summed it up well in a
recent commentary calling for a privilege for journalistic source
confidentiality when he wrote that “it is the publication’s
obligation to the public to publish what it considers newsworthy—
and not to assist the government in punishing the provider of that
news.”210
Indeed, a promise of privacy to a source is sometimes the only
way that a journalist such as Taricani can obtain what Safire terms
“newsworthy” information. A journalist who burns such a source
by breaching that promise harms not only himself and the source,
but all journalists and, more importantly, the public in general.211
As Eileen McNamara of the Boston Globe wrote in 2004,
breaching a promise of confidentiality “undermine[s] the work of
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2005).
207
Id. at *2.
208
Id.
209
James C. Goodale, Communications and Media Law; Why Reporters Go
to Jail, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 2004, at 3.
210
William Safire, Judges as Plumbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at
A27.
211
Cf. Maggie Mulvihill, As You Were Saying . . . This Journalist Stands
Tall Rather Than Give Up a Source, BOSTON HERALD, July 3, 2004, at 16
(writing that “no governmental whistleblower would confide in a reporter if he
thought the reporter were in cahoots with prosecutors or would blow his cover”
and pointing out that “so much that the public should know would remain secret
if reporters didn’t keep their promises and refrain from ratting out their
confidential sources to the government”).
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all journalists by discouraging people in sensitive situations from
sharing information about wrongdoing with reporters. Journalists
would always prefer to put their sources on the record, but there
are instances in which such candor could cost a source his job or
his physical safety.”212
The situation was so bad that, in November 2004, U.S. Senator
Christopher Dodd (D–Conn.) introduced a bill titled “The Free
Speech Protection Act of 2004,” which was designed to create a
federal shield law to protect individuals and organizations involved
in gathering and disseminating news from being hauled into
federal court and forced to disclose their sources or other
unpublished information.213 In proposing the measure, Dodd
contended that “[w]hen the public’s right to know is threatened,
and when the rights of free speech and free press are at risk, all of
the other liberties we hold dear are endangered.”214 In a January
2005 opinion piece published in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution,
Dodd elaborated on this argument, writing:
If reporters are unable to promise confidentiality to their
sources, many conscientious citizens will choose not to
come forward with information out of fear for their jobs,
their reputations, even their lives. The public’s ability to
hold those in power accountable—whether in the
government or in the private sector—will be severely
compromised. In a real sense, when the public’s right to
know is threatened, so are all of the other liberties we hold
dear.215
There was good reason to think that the public would support
the measure; a national survey of more than 650 adults conducted
in October 2004 on behalf the First Amendment Center in
Nashville, Tennessee, found that seventy-two percent of
respondents either strongly or mildly agreed with the statement
212

McNamara, supra note 182, at B1.
S. 3020, 108th Cong. (2004).
214
Andy Thibault, Good Time to be Enemy of the State, CONN. L. TRIB.,
Jan. 10, 2005, at 20.
215
Christopher J. Dodd, Public’s Right to Know on Endangered List,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 15, 2005, at 11A.
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that “journalists should be allowed to keep a news source
confidential.”216
Dodd’s proposal for congressional action clearly had the
support of the mainstream news media. In an editorial in
November 2004, the Washington Post opined:
Mr. Taricani’s case unfortunately is not unusual at all. It is
part of a rash of recent cases in which judges are seeking to
force journalists to renege on promises of confidentiality,
using the threat of jail as leverage. Without such promises,
much good journalism wouldn’t happen. If the federal
courts will not recognize a privilege for reporters such as
Mr. Taricani, as most states do, Congress needs to step in
and do it for them.217
If Congress does indeed act in 2005, it will represent a battle
between the legislative and judicial branches of government, with
the latter coming down squarely against the privilege in 2004 in
the cases of Jim Taricani, Matthew Cooper, and Judith Miller. This
clear preference for disclosure over source protection raises the
question: Why is there such reluctance on the part of judges to
extend a privacy privilege to journalists to protect their sources?
Why was there in 2004, as William Safire puts it, a “sudden wave
of judicial repression”218 of reporters? Mark Jurkowitz of the
Boston Globe observes that while “First Amendment advocates say
that privilege is vital to the free flow of information . . . some of
the public seems more skeptical, viewing journalists as putting
themselves above the law.”219 Might such skepticism be present
among judges who might see journalists as too often intruding on
others’ privacy in order to get information to sell newspapers? In
other words, if there is a perception among judges that journalists
push the boundaries of other people’s privacy rights in the name of
216

First Amendment Center, 2004 Confidential-Sources Survey, available
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=2004_confidential_
sources (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). See Richards & Calvert, supra note 178, at
A-21 (citing the survey finding).
217
Jailing Reporters, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2004, at B06.
218
Safire, supra note 210, at A27.
219
Mark Jurkowitz, Departures Anchored the Year’s Top Media Stories,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2004, at N10.
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newsgathering and reporting, then why should judges not show
them how it feels to have their private information revealed?
CONCLUSION
If the judicial opinions and statutes described and analyzed in
this article were tallied up on a mythical legal scoreboard in a
contest pitting privacy advocates against working journalists, it
would show a decisive victory for privacy in 2004 and an
overwhelming defeat for the press. As discussed in this article:
• A right to personal privacy was extended by Congress,
albeit in limited circumstances, to people in public places
under the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004;
• A right to personal privacy also was extended, in certain
federal FOIA actions, by the U.S. Supreme Court to the
family members and close relatives of the dead who, for
obvious reasons, could not assert their own privacy claims;
• The press was not allowed to print, because of privacy
concerns, the contents of truthful documents that it had
lawfully obtained in the Kobe Bryant sexual assault case;
• The press was prohibited from obtaining access, also
because of privacy concerns accompanied by right-to-fairtrial issues, to basic and fundamental information about a
criminal case pending against one of the world’s most wellknown celebrities, Michael Jackson;
• The use of journalistic hidden cameras and microphones
that intrude on personal privacy was rebuked by a federal
court judge who took, as was noted earlier, what he called a
“common sense”220 approach to privacy that rejected a
media summary judgment motion and allowed numerous
privacy-based causes of action to proceed to trial.
When journalists, however, asserted their own privacy rights—
in particular, the right to keep private the identity of their
confidential sources—they lost in several high-profile cases, such
as those involving Jim Taricani, Matthew Cooper, and Judith
220

See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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Miller.
What does all of this mean? For the news media, the
preponderance of judicial opinions and legislation against it in
2004 may reflect the findings of an independent survey conducted
that same year revealing a growing belief among the public that, as
compared to their counterparts from years past, modern
“journalists are sloppier, less professional, less moral, less caring,
more biased, less honest about their mistakes, and generally more
harmful to democracy.”221 Judges and legislators may harbor these
very same beliefs about the press—legislators, of course, often
pander to public sentiment to win elections, whether or not they
agree with those sentiments—and this may be influencing their
actions. There just might be then a disturbing correlation here for
journalists: less trust in the press may lead to fewer favorable
judicial rulings and less favorable legislation. The less-trust side of
the equation is clear,222 and the negative legal side has been
illustrated amply with multiple examples in this article.
While the news media devote a great amount of time to handwringing about whether there is a liberal news media bias,223 as do
others involved in the media,224 perhaps the media’s time would be
221

Mark Jurkowitz, Media Distrust May Be Libel-Case Key, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2005, at B1 (quoting from a “major study released in March
2004 by the Project for Excellence in Journalism”).
222
See David Weddle, Swagland, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 16, 2005, at 14
(writing that “[a] recent Gallup poll found that only 21% of those surveyed rated
newspaper reporters’ ethical standards as high or very high. Journalists ranked
lower than bankers, auto mechanics, elected officials and nursing home
operators”).
223
See, e.g., Joe Strupp et al., The Liberal Media: Myth or Reality?,
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 1, 2004 (providing a comprehensive analysis of
both data and opinions regarding a potential liberal bias in the news media).
224
See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT
BIAS AND THE NEWS (2003) (attempting to refute allegations that there is a
liberal bias in the media); BERNARD GOLDBERG, ARROGANCE: RESCUING
AMERICA FROM THE MEDIA ELITE (2003) (setting forth multiple instances of
what the former reporter for CBS News believes is a liberal bias in the
mainstream news media, including, most notably, The New York Times);
BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT
THE NEWS (2002) (providing examples that the author contends illustrate a
liberal bias in the media).
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better spent now focusing on the specific conduct and actions that
tend to erode respect for the news media while simultaneously
elevating judicial and legislative respect for privacy rights.
Journalists, in other words, cannot sit back and simply blame
pandering politicians and judges for their current state of woe.
Instead, a self-examination of their own actions may point them
out of this mess and toward a reasonable solution. If journalists
expect a right of privacy in their own relationships with sources
(think Jim Taricani and Matthew Cooper), then they may need to
be more careful about intruding on the privacy interests of others.
The solution, of course, must strike a balance that respects
privacy rights, but that allows journalists to perform their roles in a
democratic society. To achieve this balance, journalists must
educate the public (judges and legislators included) through their
actions, and not simply their pontifications in self-serving
editorials and commentaries, about the importance of their roles as
both watchdogs of government abuses of power225 and conveyors
of truthful and accurate news.226 The proper location of the
fulcrum in this delicate privacy-versus-reporter balance is, of
course, difficult to precisely pinpoint; however, it is clear that in
2004 more judicial and legislative weight was placed on the side of
personal privacy than on the side of journalists and reporters. The
press must now convince judges and legislators that the policy
interest in protecting a free press in a democratic society requires
shifting that balance back to a point that affords journalists greater
access to information and greater freedom to report the material
that they lawfully obtain.

225

See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (observing that
“[t]he press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse” and “as a
watchdog of government activity”).
226
See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing this role).

